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This paper estimates the agglomeration beneﬁts that arise from vertical linkages
between ﬁrms. The analysis is based on international trade and economic geography
theory developed by Krugman and Venables (1995). We identify the agglomeration
beneﬁts oﬀ the spatial variation in ﬁrm level nominal wages. Unusually detailed inter-
mediate input data allow us to more accurately capture spatial input/output linkages
than in previous studies. We take account of the location of input suppliers to estimate
cost linkages; and the location of demand from ﬁnal consumers and other ﬁrms to esti-
mate demand linkages. The results show that the externalities that arise from demand
and cost linkages are quantitatively important and highly localized. An understanding
of the extent and strength of spatial linkages is crucial in shaping policies that seek to
inﬂuence regional development.
JEL Classiﬁcations: F1, L6, R1.
∗We would like to thank Bill Griﬃths, Gordon Hanson, Keith Head, Russ Hilberry, David Hummels,
Wolfgang Keller, Guay Lim, Stephen Redding and Tony Venables for their comments. This paper has been
presented at the NBER Summer Institute in Cambridge in 2002, CEPR European Research Workshop in
International Trade in Munich 2002, the Empirical Investigations in International Trade workshop in Atlanta
2002, the North-East Universities Development Consortium Conference at Yale University in 2003, New York
Federal Reserve, University of Melbourne and the World Bank. We thank seminar paticipants for valuable
comments.1. Introduction
Manufacturing wages vary signiﬁcantly across regions within countries. For example, in
Indonesia’s weaving mills industry the average wage paid by a ﬁrm at the 90th percentile of
the wage distribution in 1996 was more than twice as high as that paid at the tenth percentile
(after adjusting for skill diﬀerentials). These ﬁrms were 518 kilometers apart on the island
of Java. Similar patterns are observed for other industries. The existence of such large wage
diﬀerentials raises the question as to why ﬁrms do not relocate to low wage regions and
arbitrage these diﬀerences away. The reasons we explore in this paper are related to the
potential agglomeration beneﬁts they might enjoy from being close to other ﬁrms.
Three main sources of externalities arising from geographical agglomerations have been
identiﬁed by Marshall (1920) - they are (i) input/output linkages1; (ii) labor pooling; and
(iii) knowledge spillovers. The role of input/output linkages in driving agglomeration of
industries and hence wage inequalities has recently been formalized and developed in the
international trade and economic geography literature by Krugman and Venables (1995)
and Fujita et al (2000). The theory posits that ﬁrms beneﬁt from being close to a large
supply of intermediate input producers due to savings on transport costs, and from access
to a large variety of diﬀerentiated inputs, reducing total costs, increasing proﬁts and thus
attracting more ﬁrms.2 This gives rise to a cost linkage or supply access eﬀect. Similarly,
ﬁrms beneﬁt from being close to the markets for their output due to increased demand,
giving rise to a demand linkage or market access eﬀect, which also increases proﬁts. We
use this theoretic framework to estimate the eﬀect of supply access and market access on
ﬁrm level wages in Indonesia.3 Firms in neighboring regions can also beneﬁtf r o mt h e s e
agglomerations in the form of lower prices for inputs and higher demand for their goods. We
estimate how far these pecuniary externalities spread across space.
1See Hirschman (1958).
2More intense competition in the upstream industry could also lead to lower intermediate input prices and
hence more beneﬁts to downstream ﬁrms - this would be the case if the upstream industry were oligopolistic
instead of monopolistically competitive. (See, for example, Amiti, 2001).
3We choose to examine the eﬀects on wages because this variable is likely to be more accurately measured
than alternatives such as total factor productivity or proﬁt sw h i c hr e l yo nam e a s u r eo fc a p i t a ls t o c k .
2Estimating the beneﬁts of diﬀerent sources of agglomeration and how far these beneﬁts
spread is of particular importance for regional policy development. Governments around the
world spend large sums of money in the pursuit of decentralization. This is true in developed
countries such as in the European Union, where large amounts of public expenditure are
devoted to developing the poorer southern regions. It is also true in developing countries
such as Indonesia where decentralization is currently a major political and public policy
issue. The concentration of industry on Java has fed into pre-existing sentiments of pro-
Java bias, which have fostered movements for greater decentralization. The Indonesian
government has been actively pursuing decentralization in an attempt to spread the beneﬁts
of industrialization to the other (outer) islands - with limited success. Our study gives an
indication of how large the beneﬁts of agglomeration arising from vertical linkages are and
is the ﬁrst to examine how close ﬁr m sn e e dt ob et ob e n e ﬁt from these agglomerations. It is
the spatial linkages that determine the extent to which the beneﬁts of development spread
across space. An understanding of the way in which they operate and how far they spread
is crucial when considering policies that seek to inﬂuence regional development.
Studying Indonesia gives us access to a rich data set that provides detailed information on
ﬁrms’ vertical linkages with their suppliers and information on ﬁrms’ geographic locations.
Our study is also the ﬁrst that utilizes detailed ﬁrm-level data on connections between po-
tential input suppliers and ﬁnal producers to examine cost and demand linkages, rather than
relying on aggregate input/output tables.4 We use three waves of Indonesia’s manufacturing
census, which is a complete enumeration of all ﬁrms with 20 or more employees - 1983, 1991
and 1996 and so can examine how geographical links between ﬁrms change over a long period
of rapid growth.
Indonesia’s geography, public policy and political history also make it an interesting
laboratory in which to examine the theory. Although its 200 million people are spread
over 900 islands and an east-west distance of 5,500 kms, there is large variation in the
concentration of workers and manufacturing industry across locations. Manufacturing is
4Our dataset includes ﬁrm level information on intermediate inputs. We aggregate this up to 5 digit ISIC
level giving us input/output relations for over 300 manufacturing industries. The most disaggregated I/O
table for Indonesia includes 90 manufacturing sectors.
3very heavily concentrated on the island of Java, with about three quarters of non-oil and
gas manufacturing located there. Within Java manufacturing is further concentrated in the
three main centers of Greater Jakarta, Surabaya and Bandung. See Figure 1. The substantial
internal trade costs imposed by the country’s geography have played an important role in
shaping the country’s spatial pattern of industry.
The results show that demand and cost linkages have a signiﬁcant positive impact on
manufacturing wages in Indonesia. An increase in market or supplier access from the 10th
to the 90th percentile increases wages by more than 20%. Although ﬁrms beneﬁtf r o m
vertical linkages, these beneﬁts are highly localized. That is, beneﬁts of agglomeration
spread over only a small distance. Only 10% of the beneﬁto fm a r k e ta c c e s ss p r e a d sb e y o n d
108km and 10% of the beneﬁt of supplier access beyond 262km. These ﬁndings highlight
why government policies often fail in trying to relocate industry to peripheral areas.
There are a small number of studies that also seek to examine the importance of ag-
glomeration forces arising from vertical linkages. Redding and Venables (2002) use the same
theoretical structure as we do but apply it at the country level, and ﬁnd that supply and
market access have a positive eﬀect on cross-country variation in GDP per capita. Their
measures of supply and market access are constructed from the coeﬃcients on import and
export dummies in a gravity equation. Our disaggregated approach is based on which in-
puts ﬁrms use and hence is likely to more accurately capture vertical linkages between ﬁrms.
Hanson (1998) estimates a spatial wages equation similar to ours for US manufacturing
ﬁrms, with the average wage in each county as the dependent variable. He ﬁnds evidence
supporting the positive beneﬁts of market access but does not attempt to model supply ac-
cess. His theoretic framework is based on Krugman (1991a) where agglomeration forces arise
due to the mobility of workers rather than vertical linkages between ﬁrms. Dumais, Ellison
and Glaeser (1997) estimate the eﬀect of the three sources of agglomeration on changes in
employment using US plant level data at the metropolitan level and state level. They ﬁnd
evidence of all three sources of agglomeration with labor market pooling the strongest. All of
their measures only take account of proximity of other ﬁrms within the same metropolitan
area and ignore distance to neighboring areas. They ﬁnd that although there is a lot of
4entry and exit of ﬁrms over the period of their study (between 1972 and 1992), aggregate
agglomeration patterns are relatively stable.
The existing small body of work on the concentration of industry in Indonesia, although
informative, has not speciﬁcally examined cost and demand linkages as a source of ag-
glomeration and has largely neglected an examination of the spatial aspects of such linkages.
Henderson and Kuncoro (1996) examine ﬁrm’s location decisions and ﬁnd that ﬁrms strongly
prefer locations where there are mature ﬁrms in related industries.5
Section 2 develops the formal model. Section 3 provides background information on
Indonesia and details of the data sources. Section 4 presents the results and section 5
concludes.
2. Theory
We derive our estimating equation from an international trade and economic geography
model developed by Krugman and Venables (1995) and extended in Fujita et al (1999). It
is a model in which vertical linkages between upstream and downstream ﬁrms create forces
leading to industrial agglomeration. Firms are assumed to compete in a monopolistically
competitive environment, where diﬀerentiated inputs enter the production function symmet-
rically and diﬀerentiated ﬁnal goods enter the consumers’ utility symmetrically.
2.1. Demand













i =1 , (2.1)
where Ci
k is the sub-utility function i.e. the aggregate consumption of varieties of diﬀer-
entiated industry i goods consumed in district k and si is the share of income spent on
5Blalock and Gertler (2002) estimate whether supply chains in Indonesia are the conduit for transferring
technology from foreign direct investment using aggregate input/output tables. However, they too implicity
assume that externalities are bound by district borders (at the provincial level) and hence do not model the
spatial dimension.
5industry i goods. We denote all location speciﬁc variables with subscripts and industry
speciﬁc variables with superscripts. Ci

























lk is the quantity of a variety v good in industry i produced in district l and consumed
in k. Ni
k is the number of varieties of industry i goods produced in district k. The elasticity of
substitution between varieties in each industry i is constant, given by σi > 1. The transport
cost of shipping a good from district l to k is modelled as Samuelsonian iceberg costs, with
ti
lk ≥ 1.6 In order to consume one unit of output, consumers must demand ti
lk units because
a proportion of imported goods, 1 − 1
t, melts in transit. If t =1there is free trade and if
t = ∞ there is no trade. The total transport cost of shipping a good from k to l can be





where τ is the elasticity of trade costs with respect to distance. The further a good travels
























l is the free-on-board producer price.
A consumer’s demand functions are derived using two stage budgeting. In stage one, a
constant share, si,o fi n c o m e ,yl, is allocated to industry i. In stage two, demand functions
for a representative consumer located in district k for a variety v in industry i produced
in district l is given by maximizing the sub-utility functions, equation 2.2, subject to the
budget constraint siyl. Aggregating across identical consumers, demand functions are given
by





















where Yl is aggregate income in location l.
2.2. Supply
The production technology in the manufacturing sector consists of a small ﬁxed cost of
setting up a plant, F, to produce a variety v. This gives rise to increasing returns to scale
technology; and the small size of F ensures that the number of varieties produced is large
enough to make oligopolistic interactions negligible. In each industry i, the production

























ui =1 , (2.6)
where Liv
k and Kiv
k are the labor and capital7 amounts required by each ﬁrm in industry i to
produce output, xiv
k . Cu
k is a quantity index aggregated across varieties of intermediate inputs
supplied by industry u,d e ﬁned analogously to equation 2.2. Hence, industry u0s output of
intermediate inputs enters the production function of each downstream ﬁrm through a CES
aggregator as in Ethier (1982). Note that industry i purchases many varieties of inputs from
multiple upstream industries.





























The total cost function comprises a ﬁxed cost, F i, and a variable cost, bi. The factor prices
are denoted by wiv
k , the wage of an industry i ﬁrm in district k, and by rk, the price of capital
in district k (or any other factor of production); and Pu
k is the intermediate input price index
of each upstream industry u that supplies inputs to industry i. It is analogous to equation
7We allow for more than one primary factor of production in the empirical model as in Amiti (2003).
8Each ﬁrm produces a distinct variety v. The theory assumes that ﬁrms within an industry are symmetric
but given that this is not the case in the data we superscript variables by v to allow for variation across ﬁrm
within an industry.
72.4, with i = u. The price index enters the cost function directly. The lower the price of
intermediate inputs, the lower the cost of producing industry i goods; and the higher the
number of upstream ﬁrms, the lower the price index. Being located close to lots of upstream
ﬁrms also reduces the price index due to savings on transport costs. This has a direct eﬀect
on producer prices. The fob producer price is given by proﬁt maximization, which gives the


























The mark-up over marginal cost, θi, depends on the elasticity of substitution σi. Allowing
free entry and exit of ﬁrms into each industry gives the level of output each ﬁrm must produce





F i (σi − 1)
bi . (2.9)
2.3. Aggregate demand
To calculate total demand for industry i goods produced in district k we sum across demand



































l. Demand for industry i goods not only comes from con-
sumers but also from downstream ﬁrms, with each ﬁrm spending a proportion µdi of its total
revenue on intermediate inputs produced by industry i. Demand for intermediate inputs
from downstream ﬁrms is derived using Shepard’s lemma on the price index (as shown in





l is the number of downstream ﬁrms in district l.
Substituting prices, expenditure and transport costs (equations 2.8 and 2.3) into the



















































We derive the zero proﬁtw a g eb yi m p o s i n gt h ez e r op r o ﬁt level of output, substituting for
the intermediate input price index, and rearranging. This gives the maximum wage industry



































































This is the main equation we are interested in. It embodies utility and proﬁt maximization
conditions, product market equilibrium and free entry and exit. The ﬁrst curly brackets
represent cost linkages or supplier access (SA), which the theory suggests has a positive
eﬀect on wages. Note that we do not have individual prices in our data so the measure we
construct (described below) is essentially an inverse proxy of the price index in equation
2.4. It measures the proximity of ﬁrms to their potential suppliers - the closer a ﬁrm is
to its input suppliers the lower its total cost and the higher the zero proﬁt wage. The
coeﬃcient on the distance parameter, δ1, indicates how quickly the externalities arising from
proximity to input suppliers diﬀuse across space. A positive coeﬃcient indicates that ﬁrms
in close proximity beneﬁt more than those further away. The higher this coeﬃcient the more
localized the externalities. The second curly brackets represent demand linkages or market
access (MA), which has a positive eﬀect on wages - the closer a ﬁrm is to its market, which
comprises consumers and other ﬁrms that purchase its output, the more proﬁtable it is and
hence the higher its zero proﬁt wage. Similarly, the coeﬃcient on distance, δ2, indicates how
far these beneﬁts extend across space.
Our basic estimating equation, after taking logs of equation 2.12, becomes
lnw
iv






δ2kl)+γlZl + γiZi + εik. (2.13)
9So the theory posits that wages in location k are a function of supplier access, SAi
k, and
market access, MAi
k, and the distance parameters, δ1 and δ2, as well as industry speciﬁc
eﬀects Zi, and location speciﬁce ﬀects Zl. The industry speciﬁce ﬀects capture diﬀerences in
ﬁxed costs, marginal costs and mark-ups. The location speciﬁce ﬀects capture diﬀerences in
prices of immobile factors of production other than labor such as land. We estimate equation
2.13 using non-linear estimation. This enables us to estimate a distance adjusted supplier
and market access rather than imposing the distance eﬀect.9 We will detail how we measure
each of these variables below.
Extensions and modiﬁcations to the theory Before going to the data with this theory
we need to ask how realistic the assumptions of the theory are and whether there are any other
important variables omitted that aﬀect wages. First, consider the zero proﬁt assumption.
Although ﬁrms may not earn zero proﬁts in practice, the relationship in equation 2.13 will
still hold provided that wages are an increasing function of proﬁts, which seems likely.
Second, we have allowed wages to vary by industry as well as location whereas the theory
does not give any grounds for industry-speciﬁc wages. We however cannot ignore that there is
signiﬁcant industry variation in wages within a location. These diﬀerences may be explained
by standard labor theory variables such as diﬀerences in ﬁrm size and skill requirements. We
add controls of this sort in some of the speciﬁcations below. The industry wage diﬀerentials
m a ya l s ob ed r i v e nb yd i ﬀerences in the market and supply access of diﬀerent industries
located in the same district. These diﬀerences will persist if there are frictions in labor
mobility across industries, for example, as a result of industry-speciﬁc skill acquisition. The
market access and supply access variables vary by 5-digit industry and district.
Third, the theory assumes that labor is completely immobile across locations giving rise to
location speciﬁc wages. Clearly this is not the case across districts within Indonesia. Provided
that there are some frictions in labour mobility between locations then the relationships in
2.13 will hold. This is realistic in the context of Indonesia. Ties to the land are strong and
9Other studies usually divide market access proxies, such as GDP, by distance as originally done in Harris
(1954). We experimented with modelling transport costs as ti
kl =( dkl)−τ but the exponential functional
form we use gives a better ﬁt. The functional form does not aﬀect the other estimated coeﬃcients.
10migrating to an industrial center may mean leaving one’s own ethnic group and for that
reason may be unattractive. Hence, not everyone is willing or able to migrate to the labor
markets in industrial centers.10
Fourth, other sources of agglomeration such as technological spillovers and labor pooling
could give rise to higher wages. We construct variables to capture these eﬀects and include
them as additional regressors.
3. Data and Measurement
Our analysis uses ﬁrm level data. The geographic unit of analysis is the kabupaten. Indonesia
has a ﬁve-tiered geographic system — national, provinces, districts (kabupaten), sub-districts
(kecamatan) and villages (desa).11 A map showing the geographic distribution of manu-
facturing output in 1996 by district is presented in Figure 1. There is little formal sector
manufacturing in the eastern islands (Nusa Tenggara Timur, East Timor, Maluku and Irian
Jaya) so we drop these regions from our initial sample (and they are not shown on the map).
Sulawesi has slightly more in the way of manufacturing and we leave it in because it is a
large, important land mass. The ﬁgure shows that manufacturing is concentrated largely
around Java’s urban centers, with some activity in Sumatra, and to a lesser extent Kaliman-
tan. Our sample consists of 210 districts, 88 of which are on the island of Java. These cover
an area of 1,375,369 square kilometers, roughly the total land area of Germany, France and
Spain together and an east-west distance greater than that from London to Istanbul. As can
be seen from Figure 1, there is considerable variability in terms of manufacturing activity
within relatively small geographic areas. Much of this variability would be lost if we were to
conduct the analysis at a more aggregated level.
10Note that economic geography models with labor mobility also lead to agglomeration of industry (see
Krugman, 1991b). This is the model used in Hanson (2002), which gives rise to a positive relationship
between location-speciﬁc nominal wages and market access.
11The number of provinces remained constant at 27 over the period of study. A number of kabupaten were
split into two or more during the period. We avoid problems associated with changing kabupaten borders
by using the kabupaten borders from the earliest year (1983). Urban centers of economic activity are often
split oﬀ into their own district ( called kotamadya) for administrative purposes. We merge all kotamadya
that existed in 1983 back into their neighboring kabupaten. Although there is considerable variation in the
size of kabupaten across Indonesia, kabupaten size is much more uniform within Java and within the Outer
Islands. All but one of our speciﬁcations separate out these two regions.
113.1. Sources
Our main data source is the Manufacturing Survey of Large and Medium-sized ﬁrms (Survei
Industri, SI). This is an annual census of all manufacturing ﬁrms in Indonesia with 20 or
more employees (N=22,997 in 1996). The SI data capture the formal manufacturing sector
- it collects an unusually rich array of ﬁrm level data which includes information on ﬁrm
output, imports, exports, wages, employment by skill level, and foreign ownership.
Most importantly for this study, the SI questionnaire also asks each ﬁrm to list all of
their individual intermediate inputs and the amount spent on each in rupiah. Although this
information is not routinely prepared, it was coded up by the Indonesian Statistical Agency
(Badan Pusat Statistic, BPS) and made available to us for the year 1998. For all other
years the only available information on inputs is the total expenditure on domestic inputs
and imported inputs. We aggregate the 1998 data up within 5 digit industry categories
to provide us with a 307 manufacturing input/output table, and assume that the mix of
inputs used by industries does not change over our sample period. Combining the input
codes with the location codes we are able to link each ﬁrm to all potential suppliers in
Indonesia and construct the supplier access variable.12 Similarly in reverse, we can identify
the location of ﬁrms that are potential purchasers of an industry’s output and so construct
the market access variables. The 1998 data also lists raw materials used by ﬁrms but data
at the district level on raw material production is not readily available.13 The omission
of such information would constitute a potentially serious omitted variables problem for
industries that are raw materials intensive. For this reason we drop such industries - this
includes all food industries (2 digit code=31). Note that data on the “dropped” industries
are still used in the construction of the supply and market access variables. For example,
the “threads” industry is dropped but these ﬁrms supply inputs to the textiles industries
and so information on them is used in the calculation of the supply access variable. We also
drop the "not elsewhere classiﬁed" industries. Our ﬁnal sample has observations covering
12We include inputs of all industries that constitute 10% or more of total intermediate inputs.
13It should be possible to construct kabupaten level agricultural output variables from the Agricultural
Survey - something we plan to pursue in future work.
12172 industries.
In addition to the SI data, we use data on non-oil gross regional domestic product (GRDP)
at the district level to construct the regional income data needed for the calculation of the
ﬁnal demand component of the market access variable. These data are also produced by
BPS (BPS 1995, 1998, 2000a). The earliest year for which such data are available is 1983.
Oil revenues in Indonesia accrue almost entirely to the central government so it is important
to net them out when seeking to construct a measure of regional income. Non-oil GRDP
ﬁgures are published from 1993. For years prior to 1993 we predict district oil revenues from
available concurrent provincial ﬁgures and subtract this from the GRDP (including oil) data.
Final demand shares from Input-Output tables published in BPS (1992, 1997) are applied
to the income to construct ﬁnal consumer demand at the 5 digit industry level.14
We construct a measure of skilled labor from the 1995 Intercensal Survey. It is a large
household survey (N=216,945) which is conducted at ﬁve ten yearly intervals midway be-
tween census years. We use information on the educational attainment of the population to
control for diﬀerences in skill levels across districts.
BPS(2000b) provides information on land utilization in Indonesia. From this we construct
a variable for the percentage of the district’s potentially arable land that is not covered with
housing and another for the percentage of district land area that is swamp. We use these to
proxy for the cost of immobile factors of production and location amenity.
Finally, distances between districts were calculated using ArcView’s GIS technology with
a district level map of Indonesia. We construct pairwise measures of the greater circle
distance between the geographic center of each location. We thus end up with 210 distance
variables (in kilometers). The distances range from a minimum of 6.2 km between North
Jakarta and Central Jakarta to a maximum of 3,304 km from Aceh Besar in the north-western
tip of Sumatra to Sangihe Talaud in the far north-east of North Sulawesi.
14The input-output tables have a total of 90 sectors in 1995 and 87 manufacturing sectors in 1990. These
are more aggregated than the 5-digit ISIC industry categories. We apportion the ﬁnal demand shares between
5-digit industries on the basis of the value of national output (net of exports) of each 5 digit industry.
133.2. Measurement
The dependent variable - the average ﬁrm wage - is constructed by dividing each ﬁrm’s annual
wage bill (in Rupiah) by the average number of workers employed over that 12 month period.
We then convert this to a daily wage assuming a six day working week. These data produce a
wage distribution similar to that for formal sector workers in the most commonly used source
of Indonesian wage data, the Labor Force Survey (Sakernas).15 The supplier access variable
is calculated from ﬁrms’ self-reported value of output in rupiah; and the market access
variable is calculated from ﬁrm’s self-reported total expenditure on intermediate inputs.
Supplier Access The supplier access eﬀect comes through the price indices of inter-
mediate inputs, P u
k ,d e ﬁned as in equation 2.4 with i = u. Since individual input price data

































l is the total value of intermediate inputs produced by industry u in district l, Xu
l ,
divided by the total produced in Indonesia, Xu. We know where in Indonesia these inputs are
produced, however we do not know exactly from which location these inputs are purchased
so our measure represents potential suppliers rather than actual suppliers. Although we do
not have individual prices, the cost linkages are still well-represented in equation 3.1 since
this ‘price index’ is lower the higher the share of intermediate inputs that are produced in
close proximity. The share of intermediate inputs are weighted by the share of industry u in
the total cost of industry i inputs, aui.

















15Alatas and Cameron (2003) compare kernel density estimates of the wage distribution from both sources
for the Jakarta area and ﬁnd them to be similar.
14The inner bracketed term sums demand across all downstream ﬁrms and consumers in lo-
cation l that demand industry i goods. Total demand from downstream ﬁr m si sd e ﬁned
as the total expenditure of downstream ﬁrms in district l on intermediate inputs, Id
l , times
the share of downstream ﬁrms’ intermediate input expenditure that is spent on industry
i goods, adi (which equals µdiNd
l pd
lxd
l in equation 2.12). This, scaled by total demand in
Indonesia by ﬁrms and consumers, TDi, is distance adjusted (in the same way as the supply
access variable) so that demand from consumers within the same district receives a higher
weighting than demand from locations further away. The size of the distance adjustment is
empirically determined.
International trade Treating international demand and supply in the same way as
their domestic counterparts would require detailed production data and demand patterns
for all countries that trade with Indonesia. These data are unavailable at a suﬃciently
disaggregated level so we begin by simply adding controls to the wage equation for the share
of the ﬁrm’s output that is exported and the share of the ﬁrm’s inputs that are imported.
We then try an alternative speciﬁcation that is more closely aligned with the theory. In this
speciﬁcation we model the rest of the world (ROW) as being in one geographic location and
then distance to the ROW varies across Indonesia only via a ‘distance to port’ component



















where exshare is the percentage of the ﬁrm’s output that is exported. We allow exports to
have a diﬀerent eﬀect on wages than domestic demand via γx and we estimate the parameter
on distance to the nearest port (δx).16 For the supply access variables we treat imported
inputs as a separate industry - on the basis of quality diﬀerences between imported and
domestic inputs. This requires a separate term for all imported inputs, thus adding the
16In this speciﬁcation the domestic demand term is deﬂated by (1−exshare) so it represents the share of
total (international and domestic) demand that comes from each kabupaten.
15share of imported inputs, exponentially weighted by the distance to the closest port as an
explanatory variable. We ﬁnd that the coeﬃcients on domestic supplier and market access
are not aﬀected by this alternative treatment of trade so we then proceed with the simpler
speciﬁcation.
Labor Pooling To examine the eﬀects of labor pooling we follow Dumais, Ellison and
Glaeser (1997) and construct an index that captures the similarity of ﬁrm f in district k’s




















where Lfsis the fraction of ﬁrm f’s labor force that has education level s, E
f
k is the number
of workers in ﬁrm f,a n dEk is the total number of workers in district k.T h e i n d e x t h u s
compares the educational composition of ﬁrm f’s workforce with the education composition
of other ﬁrms in the same district. The education categories are no education, primary
education, lower secondary high school, upper secondary high school and tertiary educated.
The index is a sum of squared deviations measure. The higher the value of the index, the
better the match between the ﬁrm’s education composition and that of surrounding ﬁrms.
The maximum value of zero indicates a perfect match.17 A pooled market for specialized
worker skills beneﬁts workers and ﬁrms. Krugman (1991b) shows that it is more proﬁtable
for ﬁrms to locate where there is a pooled market for skills despite competition from other
ﬁrms for workers because the beneﬁts of a more eﬃcient labor force outweigh the competition
eﬀects. Hence, we hypothesize that the index will have a positive eﬀect on wages.
Technological and Knowledge Spillovers We measure the eﬀect of technology
spillovers by proximity to other ﬁrms within the same 5 digit category - ie the number
of ﬁrms in the same industry in every district, distance adjusted in the same way as the
linkage variables. The more ﬁrms in close proximity with related technology the more likely
17We calculated this measure at the provincial and kabupaten level. The provincial level variable gave a
better ﬁt.
16there "will be ideas in the air" that a ﬁrm can learn from. However, in addition to capturing
spillovers (which would allow ﬁrms to pay higher wages), this variable may pick up the “com-
petition eﬀect” i.e. it could be seen as an inverse proxy of the price index, Pi
l , of substitute
goods in equation 2.12 hence putting downward pressure on ﬁrms’ proﬁts and their ability
to pay high wages. Thus, a priori the direction of this variable’s impact is ambiguous.
Ideally, one would have access to a technology ﬂow matrix or to research and development
stock measures in order to properly capture the eﬀects of technological spillovers. Dumais,
Ellison and Glaeser (2002) rely on a technology ﬂow matrix published in 1974. We do not
follow their approach because the matrix is too aggregated for our purposes with categories
not easily matched to ours and we expect that technology ﬂows would have changed consid-
erably since 1974. Keller (2002) uses R&D expenditure to estimate technological spillovers
on productivity levels in nine OECD countries. In Indonesia, it is more likely that new
knowledge from R&D is imported rather than coming from domestic R&D - given that less
than 10% of the ﬁrms in our sample invested in any form of R&D in 1996; and of those that
do, the median expenditure is less than US$3000 per annum. 18
We also construct a measure of market share to capture the competition eﬀect more
directly. It is deﬁned as the ratio of a ﬁrm’s output to the 5-digit industry total. We
hypothesize that this variable should be positive because an increase in competition (lower
market share) reduces proﬁts and hence wages.19
4. Results
4.1. Preliminary Examination of the Data
Our initial sample covers 13,472 ﬁrms from 172 industries located across 177 diﬀerent dis-
tricts.20 Of these ﬁrms, 11,361 are on the island of Java and 2,111 in the Outer Islands. We
18Note that the highest R&D industries in Indonesia are also not those identiﬁed by Keller (2002) as high
R&D. Even if expenditures were more substantial we would be unable to construct an R&D stock variable
as in that study because R&D data is only available since 1995. Estimating beneﬁts of knowledge spillovers
via imports and foreign direct investment is beyond the scope of this paper.
19However, it should be noted that Nickell (1996) shows that increased competition leads to increased
productivity in the UK, which would then likely lead to an increase in wages.
2038 of the 210 kabupaten do not have ﬁrms in the industries included in our sample.
17examine linkages between these ﬁrms and ﬁrms in the full range of 210 districts and 307
industries. Table 1 presents summary statistics of the data. Manufacturing industry is very
agglomerated in Indonesia, obviously in Java and also within Java. In 1996, 82% of for-
mal sector manufacturing output was produced in Java, 40.2% within Greater Jakarta, and
46.8% in the three main manufacturing centers of Greater Jakarta, Bandung and Surabaya.
The share of output being produced in Java has not changed dramatically over time. It was
80.5% in 1983 but within Java it has become more concentrated - only 38.7% was produced in
the major centers in 1983. Similar patterns are seen for individual industries. The garment
industry is the largest industry in our sample (in terms of the number of ﬁrms). It is highly
concentrated in Java (96.3%), with 69.9% of total production occurring in the Jakarta region
(up from 63.8% in 1983). Hence it appears that even as travel and communication across
s p a c eb e c o m em o r ee ﬃcient, industry has continued to become more localized. The means
of the market and supply access variables are lower in the Outer Islands owing to its lesser
industrialization and also its lower population density. Java constitutes only 6.6% of the
Indonesian land mass but 60% of its population. There are 900 people per square kilometer
versus 44.2 in the Outer Islands. In 1996 64% of Indonesian non-oil GDP was produced in
Java.
Average wages do not diﬀer markedly between Java and the Outer Islands. Wages are
generally higher in the areas where industry is clustered but there are exceptions. For
example, wages are relatively high in parts of Kalimantan and Sulawesi where there is not
much manufacturing. The raw within-district correlation between wages and the linkage
variables shows a positive relationship as hypothesized, with a correlation of 0.053 and
0.198 for market access and supply access respectively. And the correlation between the own
district supplier and market access variables is only 0.23. This low correlation enables us
to overcome a concern that has arisen in previous studies where supplier and market access
variables have been highly correlated. As a result of being able to accurately pinpoint the
location of suppliers and also to identify suppliers at the 5-digit level, we are able to separately
and precisely estimate the two diﬀerent - and sometimes competing- vertical linkages.
184.2. Formal Results
Equation 2.13 is estimated using non-linear least squares. All standard errors have been
corrected for clustering by 5-digit industry using a generalization of the White method.21
We include locational dummies for the islands of Sumatra, Kalimantan and Sulawesi in all
estimations and also a dummy for Jakarta to take account of the beneﬁts of being located
close to the central government. Our industry controls are at the two digit level and are
relative to the textiles, clothing, footwear and leather industry. We include more disaggre-
gated industry controls in further speciﬁc a t i o n sb e l o w .T a b l e2p r e s e n t st h er e s u l t sf o rt h e
whole of Indonesia, and Java and the Outer Islands separately. The results for Indonesia
as a whole (column 1) show that demand and cost linkages have a positive and strongly
signiﬁcant eﬀect, as predicted by the theory. Both the coeﬃcients on distance (δ)a n dt h e
coeﬃcients on the distance-adjusted supply and market access variables (γ)a r es i g n i ﬁcant.
These variables explain 29% of the variation in log wages. Column 2 presents the results for
Java. The coeﬃcients here are also positive and signiﬁcant, and the γ’s are larger, suggest-
ing that the agglomeration externalities are quantitatively more important in Java than in
Indonesia as a whole. The results show that a distance-adjusted increase of 10% in supplier
access increases wages by 1.03% and a 10% increase in market access allows ﬁrms to increase
wages by 2.2%.
The parameters on distance, δ, indicate how quickly the market and supply access
spillovers decay with distance. If δ =0 ,t h e na ni n c r e a s ei nt h ee x t e r n a l i t yi no n ed i s -
trict has the same eﬀect on wages in all districts in Indonesia, regardless of how far they are
from the source. If δ = ∞ then an increase in the externality in location l will have no
eﬀect on wages in district k (k 6= l)—a l le ﬀects are completely localized which means that
ﬁrms only beneﬁt from demand and supply within their own district. To examine how far
the beneﬁts of market access and supply access spread we use Keller’s (2002) approach and
calculate at what distance from the district are 90% of the eﬀects of the district’s externality
dissipated. This involves ﬁnding the D∗ that satisﬁes 0.1=e−δD∗
. The results from column
21See Rogers(1993).
19(2) indicate that both eﬀects are highly localized with only 10% of the market access beneﬁt
spreading beyond 85 kms; and the supplier access beneﬁt spreading a little further with 10%
of the beneﬁt going beyond 231 kilometers.
Column 3 presents the results for the Outer Islands. In sharp contrast to Java, all of
the market access and supply access parameters are statistically insigniﬁcant for the Outer
Islands. The Outer Islands are much more sparsely populated and much less industrialized
than Java. In 1996 there were only 4,339 formal sector ﬁrms in the outer regions (or 0.003
ﬁrms per square kilometer) compared with 18,506 (0.145 per square kilometer) in Java and
many of these were involved in the processing of natural products like wood and rubber.
The linkage terms in the ﬁrst three columns include links to ﬁrms on all islands. In
Column (4), Table 2 we re-estimate the equation for Java but now exclude links to the Outer
Islands. The results show that linkages to the Outer Islands do not generate agglomeration
externalities for ﬁrms on Java - the coeﬃcients in columns 2 and 4 are almost identical.
These results underpin the diﬃculty the Indonesian government has experienced in trying
to move industry to the outer regions. Not only is the very small number of ﬁrms in these
regions a problem, the Outer Islands are so far from Java so as to not beneﬁtf r o mt h e
existence of the Javanese markets and suppliers.22
The coeﬃcients on the percentage of output exported and the percentage of inputs im-
ported are positively signed and signiﬁcant in all of the speciﬁcations, conﬁrming that the
more internationally focused ﬁrms pay higher wages. To check that these results are not sen-
sitive to the way trade is included, we re-estimate column (4) with the alternative treatment
of international trade (described above) and report the results in the ﬁnal column. Prior
to 1985 Indonesian government regulation forced all international shipping through one of
four ports - Tanjung Priok (Jakarta) and Surabaya in Java, Belawan in North Sumatra and
Ujungpandang in Sulawesi. Since 1985 investment in port infrastructure has remained cen-
tered on these four ports and they remain the most important gateways for international
freight. We include imports as a separate term, adjusted by distance to the nearest of these
port; and we include exports inside the market access term, also adjusted by distance to the
22The insigniﬁcance of the linkage variables for outer islands persists with the inclusion of further controls.
20nearest port. Both the exports and imports terms remain signiﬁcant. It is diﬃcult to inter-
pret the coeﬃcient on distance as a spread of externalities given that the distances are only
to the port and not to the trading partner but the statistically signiﬁcant estimate of δX as
0.55 shows that exporting ﬁrms beneﬁt from being close to a port. The distance coeﬃcient
on imports, δm,i s0.44 but insigniﬁcant, suggesting that access to imports is unaﬀected by
a ﬁrm’s location within Java. Note that these ﬁrms do not necessarily import the goods
themselves, they may buy imported inputs from an importing agent and hence being close
to a port may be less vital.
The estimates of the domestic supply and market access parameters are almost completely
unchanged by the new treatment of trade - the coeﬃcient on supply access is slightly higher
and the one on market access slightly lower but both fall well-within the 95% conﬁdence
interval of the column (4) estimates. Both the import and export terms remain signiﬁcant.
Given that this more complicated alternative speciﬁcation does not aﬀect the market and
supply access parameters, subsequent speciﬁcations will use the simpler speciﬁcation.
Note that the Jakarta dummy is insigniﬁcant in Columns (2) and (4). Thus, having
controlled for the market and supplier access that Jakarta provides, there are no additional
beneﬁts from being in the nation’s capital. Below we restrict our attention to more closely
characterizing the linkages on Java (excluding linkages to the Outer Islands).
4.3. Additional controls
Table 3 examines whether the results for Java are robust to the addition of further controls.
Other sources of agglomeration In Column 2 of Table 3 we add variables that
attempt to capture the other forces of agglomeration - labor pooling and technological
spillovers. The labor pooling index is strongly signiﬁcant and positive, suggesting that ﬁrms
beneﬁt from the presence of other ﬁrms that use a similar mix of skills and as a result will
be more productive and pay higher wages. To capture technological spillovers we include
the number of ﬁrms in the ﬁrm’s own 5-digit industry. This is calculated for each district
and then distance-weighted in the same way as the market and supply access variables. It
21is negatively signed and signiﬁcant indicating that proximity to other ﬁrms in the same in-
dustry reduces the zero proﬁt wage. It may be that the beneﬁts of spillovers are oﬀset by
competition eﬀects (even though we have controlled for competition by also including the
market share variable - the ﬁrm’s share of Java-wide same 5-digit industry output - which
has a positive and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient as hypothesized), or that spillovers arise through
other channels not captured by this variable. The coeﬃcient on distance, δ3, is insigniﬁ-
cant indicating that competition comes from ﬁrms with equal force from any location within
Java.
Industry and ﬁrm speciﬁcv a r i a b l e s The industry dummies are intended to capture
diﬀerences between ﬁxed and variable costs and industry mark-ups. The results so far include
controls at the 2 digit level, however these industry diﬀerences may persist within the 2 digit
categories and so Column 3 of Table 3 presents the results with 3-digit industry dummies.
The coeﬃcients on the linkage terms only change very slightly.23 The spillover variable is
now insigniﬁcant so we drop this variable from subsequent speciﬁcations.
Industry wage diﬀerentials are known to exist for a number of reasons that are not in the
theoretical model and that have not so far been controlled for - such as diﬀerences in human
capital requirements and diﬀering ﬁrm characteristics. Column 4 adds these additional
controls. Speciﬁcally, the percentage of workers that are tertiary educated, high school
educated and female, ﬁrm size (number of workers), the percentage of government ownership
and the percentage of foreign ownership in the ﬁrm. In addition we control for the education
attainment of the population within each district. The variable skill is calculated from the
1995 Intercensal Survey and is the percentage of a district’s population that has at least a
high school education. Adding these controls increases the adjusted R2 from 0.37 (with the
3 digit dummies) to 0.47. All of the additional controls are strongly statistically signiﬁcant
and are signed as expected. For example, a one percentage point increase in the percentage
of workers who are female decreases average ﬁrm wages by 0.32%.T h e c o e ﬃcients on the
23We also estimated the equations with 4-digit dummies (not reported here). The coeﬃcients on the
linkage terms, and the estimates of the δs were the same as with the 3-digit industry dummies.
22market and supply access variables remain statistically signiﬁcant and are slightly smaller in
magnitude.
Location speciﬁce ﬀects A potential concern with our estimates is that we may be
picking up a relationship that is being driven by a third omitted variable that is correlated
with both wages and the linkage variables. For example, it may be that ﬁrms are attracted
to districts which have good existing infrastructure such as roads, telecommunications and
a skilled workforce or that are attractive to live in and that wages are bid up in these areas.
We have already controlled for the skill level of the population, now we add controls for
exogenous amenity. Previous studies have used variables reﬂecting the weather of locations
- following Roback (1982) average temperature, humidity and wind speed are typically used.
These variables do not adequately capture diﬀerences in exogenous amenity in Java which are
almost invariably hot and humid.24 Instead, to capture exogenous amenity we have included
a dummy variable for whether the district is on the coast, the distance to the closest major
port and another measuring the percentage of the district’s area that is swamp land. We
also include a measure of the percentage of potentially arable land that is not housing as
an inverse proxy of the price of immobile factors and hence expect this variable to have a
positive eﬀect on wages. All these variables are at the district level.
Column 5 controls for exogenous amenity in one further way. We include the total number
of formal sector manufacturing ﬁrms in each district as an explanatory variable. This variable
reﬂects the attractiveness of a district to ﬁrms (including pre-existing infrastructure) so we
would expect it to be positively signed. To reduce the possibility of this variable being
correlated with the error term we lag it 10 years. This takes us back to the early stages of
Java’s rapid industrialization. The number of formal sector ﬁrms almost doubled in Java
between 1986 and 1996 (10,159 compared to 18,506).
All of the additional variables are signed as expected but only being on the coast and the
number of ﬁrms in 1986 are statistically signiﬁcant. The ten-year lagged number of ﬁrms
24Bandung is an exception to this. Its maximum temperatures hover around the mid 20’s (celsius),
compared to the low 30’s for most other locations. In the sensitivity analysis we experiment with dropping
Bandung and the results are not sensitive to its exclusion.
23is an important determinant of wages, but the extent of a district’s industrialization is not
driving our supply and market access results. The coeﬃcients on the linkage terms remain
signiﬁcant and the point estimates remain similar in magnitude.
Interpretation of Magnitudes Column (6) presents our preferred speciﬁcation. It drops
the insigniﬁcant location-speciﬁc variables. Market and supply access have a signiﬁcant
positive eﬀect on wages of similar magnitude: an increase in supply access of 10% increases
wages by 0.9% a n da ni n c r e a s ei nm a r k e ta c c e s so f10% increases wages by 1.5%.M o s t
of this beneﬁt dissipates over a short distance: only 10% of the beneﬁto fm a r k e ta c c e s s
spreads farther than 108 km and only 10% of the beneﬁt of supply access spreads beyond
262 km. Another way of examining the magnitude of the eﬀects is to analyze the eﬀect of
reducing distance between all districts. For example, suppose all districts were 20% closer
to each other than they are now. Our results indicate that the resulting improved supplier
a c c e s sw o u l dl e a dt oa na v e r a g ei n c r e a s ei nw a g e so f1.7% and a maximum of 7.2%;a n d
t h ei m p r o v e dm a r k e ta c c e s sw o u l dl e a dt oa na v e r a g ei n c r e a s eo f2.9%, with a maximum of
13.1%.
To examine the relative magnitude of the diﬀerent sources of agglomeration we consider
how an increase in each variable from the 10th to the 90th percentile aﬀects wages. We ﬁnd
that market access has the largest average eﬀect on wages of 26.6%; then supplier access with
an average of 21.8%; and labor pooling the smallest eﬀect of 11.9%. Similarly, increasing each
variable by an average of 10 percentiles, 20 percentiles or 25 percentiles shows the linkage
variables to have the largest eﬀect. For example, the results from increasing variables by
an average of 25 percentiles are as follows: market access increases wages by 9.6%; supplier
access by 8.4%; and labor pooling by 3.1%.25 This contrasts with Dumais, Ellison and
Glaeser (2002) that ﬁnds labor pooling to have the largest eﬀect in the US. Labor pooling
may be less important in a developing country because skills are not as diﬀerentiated as in
a developed country.
25This is calculated by averaging the eﬀect of an increase from the 25th to the 50th percentile and from
the 50th to the 75th percentile. This is consistent with the elasticities. A 10% increase in labor pooling
r e s u l t si na0 . 0 9 %i n c r e a s ei nw a g e sw h i c hi ss i g n i ﬁcantly smaller than the market and supply access eﬀects.
244.4. Sensitivity Tests
Table 4 presents the results of a number of sensitivity tests to explore the possibility of
endogeneity arising from reverse causality. That is, we are concerned that the location
of ﬁrms, and hence the patterns of supply and market access may be determined by wages,
rather than the reverse. First, following the approach of Hanson (2000) and Keller (2002) we
re-estimate the equation with the full set of controls but dropping districts that individually
constitute more than 2% of Indonesia’s GDP. This drops the main industrial centers of
Jakarta, Surabaya and Bandung. Wages in these large centers of economic activity are the
most likely to determine location patterns both within these centers and in neighboring
districts. Hence the sensitivity of the results to dropping these observations gives us an
indication of the extent of any endogeneity bias in our results. Dropping these cities also
reduces the possibility of simultaneity bias arising from natural geographic features in these
locations that may explain agglomeration - for example, Jakarta and Surabaya’s natural
harbours and Bandung’s elevated position.
Second, in a similar vein, we drop the own district component of the market and supplier
access variables. If the linkage terms were a function of wages then this is more likely to be
the case for own district eﬀects.
Third, we lag both the linkage variables ﬁve years. This reduces the possible correlation
between the error term and these variables. However, to the extent that these variables are
correlated over time any endogeneity that exists will persist.
Finally, we drop observations on industries for whom more than 20% of inputs come
from within their own 5 digit industry. This reduces the scope for reverse causality coming
through the supply access variable and also ensures that the variable is indeed picking up
vertical linkages rather than horizontal spillovers.
The estimates of all four market access and supply access parameters (γ1,γ2,δ1,δ2) are
robust to all of these sensitivity tests. The coeﬃcients remain signiﬁcant. The point estimates
in many cases are almost exactly the same and where they diﬀer they lie well-within the 95
percentile conﬁdence interval of the original estimates. Having established that the results
25are robust we now examine changes over time.
4.5. Changes Over Time
We compare results for 1983 and 1991 with 1996 in Table 5. Summary statistics are pre-
sented in Table A1. Some of the control variables are not available in the earlier years so we
also present results for 1996 with a smaller, comparable set of regressors. The supply access
estimates are signiﬁcant in all years and very stable across time. The market access parame-
ters are stable from 1991 to 1996. However, the coeﬃcient γ2 is signiﬁcantly smaller in 1983
(0.09 compared with 0.19 in 1996 and 1991). This suggests that market access has become
more important over time. The point estimate is much higher in 1983 than in the later
years (decreasing from 7.2 in 1983 to 3.4 in 1991 and further to 2.6 in 1996). This suggests
that the market access externality may have become less localized over time. However the
estimate for 1983 is estimated so imprecisely that its 95% conﬁdence interval encompasses
the estimates from the other years.
As transport infrastructure and telecommunications improvements take place one might
expect that externalities arising from agglomeration beneﬁts would spread over longer dis-
tances. However, as technologies become more advanced and products become more sophisti-
cated the need for face to face communication becomes more important making externalities
even more localized. These two oﬀsetting eﬀects may explain why the spread of the supply
access externality has remained constant over time while the market access eﬀect may have
become more diﬀused. Given that a large part of the market access component comprises
ﬁnal demand from consumers, where face to face contact between producers and consumers
is not so important, the fall in transport costs may dominate the eﬀect.26
The stability of the results across time is signiﬁcant in two senses. First in terms of the
robustness of our results - the variables for 1991and 1983 were constructed from a completely
separate set of data and produce very similar estimates. Second, in a substantive sense -
26These ﬁndings are consistent with the international trade and distance literature. For example, Berthelon
a n dF r e u n d( 2 0 0 3 )ﬁnd that the eﬀect of distance on international trade has not changed for 75% of industries
but has become more important for 25% of industries, suggesting that these industries trade less with more
distant countries than they did 20 years ago.
26even though Indonesia experienced dramatic change between 1983 and 1996 in terms of
improvements in infrastructure, the eﬀects of supplier access remained largely unchanged,
with some increase in the market access eﬀe c t .T h i si sc o n s i s t e n tw i t hﬁndings of studies such
as Dumais, Ellison and Glaeser (2002) which show that although there is a large amount
of individual entry and exit of ﬁrms over time, the overall patterns of agglomeration are
persistent.
5. Conclusions
This paper examines the beneﬁts of agglomeration arising from vertical linkages between
ﬁrms. Using ﬁrm level data for Indonesia from 1996, 1991 and 1983, we show that ﬁrms
beneﬁt greatly from proximity to a large supply of inputs and good market access. Firms
with the best supply or market access can aﬀord to pay more than 20% higher wages than
those with the poorest access. Labor pooling is less quantitatively important and we were
unable to identify any positive eﬀects from technology spillovers. These results are robust
to controlling for more standard explanations of wage variation such as skill levels and ﬁrm
size; and infrastructure variables. The results are also robust to a set of sensitivity tests
designed to test the extent of endogeneity of the market access and supply access variables.
Further, we found that the beneﬁts of vertical linkages are highly localized. Firms do
beneﬁt from vertical linkages but not if they are located in the periphery. Firms located
108 kms (262 kms) from the market (supply) access agglomeration receive only 10% of the
beneﬁt of those located at the source. We show that ﬁrms located in Indonesia’s Outer
Islands are too far away to beneﬁt from the agglomeration of industries on the main island
of Java.
The large agglomeration beneﬁts arising from vertical linkages combined with the high
localization of the beneﬁts can explain why ﬁrms are reluctant to relocate to low wage areas.
These results also underscore the diﬃculty governments around the world have in generating
economic growth in far ﬂung regions - where the citizens are often the poorest and beneﬁtt h e
least from economic growth. Although our results are based on Indonesian data, they clearly
27have more general implications. Large regional inequalities are a world-wide phenomenon
and governments continue to spend large sums of money to try to attract ﬁrms to poorer
regions. Given the size of the estimated agglomeration externalities, our results suggest that
overcoming the attraction of existing agglomerations is likely to continue to be a diﬃcult
task.
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Figure 1: Geographic Distribution of Formal Sector Manufacturing Output, 1996 
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Mean Std Min Max Mean Std Min Max Mean Std Min Max
wage 7905.53 6226.97 920.85 51877.92 7893.89 6245.25 928.81 51877.92 7968.18 6128.72 920.85 50399.16
supplier access 0.05 0.08 0 1 0.05 0.08 0 1 0.02 0.04 0 0
market access 0.02 0.04 0 1 0.02 0.04 0 1 0.01 0.02 0 0
imports 0.10 0.26 0 1 0.11 0.25 0 1 0.09 0.26 0 1
exports 0.17 0.34 0 1 0.14 0.32 0 1 0.30 0.42 0 1
size 206.21 594.75 12 23516 205.28 613.45 12.00 23516 211.22 481.90 14 5184
foreign ownership 0.05 0.19 0 1 0.05 0.19 0 1 0.06 0 0 1
govt ownership 0.01 0.12 0 1 0.01 0.11 0 1 0.03 0.15 0 1
female participation 0.37 0.30 0 1 0.37 0.30 0 1 0.40 0.31 0 1
high school education 0.31 0.27 0 1 0.29 0.26 0 1 0.39 0.28 0 1
tertiary education 0.03 0.06 0 0.93 0.03 0.06 0 0.93 0.03 0.06 0 0.81
population skill level 0.36 0.13 0.09 0.62 0.36 0.14 0.09 0.62 0.35 0.12 0.12 0.56
labour pooling -0.03 0.04 -0.39 0.00 -0.03 0.04 -0.36 0.00 -0.03 0.04 -0.39 0
spillovers 50.66 95.24 1 393 56.79 101.68 1 393 17.67 31 1 128
competition 0.01 0.07 0 1 0.0145 0.0662 0 1
firms86 338.05 299.88 0 1143 374.24 305.30 2 1143 143.29 165 0 450
coast 0.67 0.47 0 1 0.62 0.48 0 1 0.91 0 0 1
swamp 0.03 0.04 0 0.60 0.02 0.04 0 0.14 0.05 0.07 0 0.60
land 0.59 0.20 0 0.96 0.56 0.20 0.06 0.96 0.73 0.12 0 0.96
skill 0.36 0.13 0 0.62 0.36 0.14 0.09 0.62 0.35 0.12 0 0.56




Table 1: Summary Statistics
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Supply Access - γ1 0.0556 0.1031 0.0159 0.0994    0.1201  
(0.0191) (0.0239) (0.0098) (0.0233) (0.0198)
Distance, km/100 - δ1 1.7899 0.9962 3.0841 1.0654    0.9061  
(0.7069) (0.2329) (2.4139) (0.2636) (0.1877)
Market Access - γ2: 0.1071 0.2224 0.0022 0.2215 0.2022
(0.028) (0.0395) (0.0194) (0.0389) (0.0342)
Distance, km/100 - δ2 2.8104 2.7127 5.4849 2.6943 2.782
(1.2288) (0.4206) (49.3683) (0.4108) (0.4863)
Exports 0.3348 0.2561 0.4611 0.2559 0.3805
(0.0587) (0.0417) (0.0649) (0.0417) (0.0848)
Distance to port/100, km - δX    0.5581  
(0.1141)
Imports 0.4059 0.38 0.3151 0.3806    0.5265  
(0.0869) (0.0942) (0.0723) (0.0942) (0.1015)









Jakarta 0.1124 -0.0337 -0.0316 -0.0322
(0.0316) (0.0309) (0.0312) (0.0312)
Industry Dummies:
Wood/Furniture 0.1207 0.2297 0.1918 0.2282    0.2104  
(0.039) (0.0327) (0.098) (0.0329) (0.0365)
Paper/Printing 0.3681 0.3643 0.5494 0.3636 0.3634
(0.03) (0.0248) (0.0933) (0.025) (0.0231)
Chemicals/Plastics 0.3052 0.3273 0.3942 0.327    0.3200  
(0.0721) (0.0711) (0.106) (0.0712) (0.0684)
Non-metallic Minerals 0.1874 0.2266 0.3351 0.2258 0.2267
(0.0367) (0.0312) (0.0824) (0.0313) (0.0277)
Metals 0.5573 0.5047 0.5397 0.5044 0.5173
(0.1126) (0.1114) (0.1419) (0.1114) (0.1086)
Machinery and Components 0.3847 0.3563 0.6174 0.3557    0.3471  
(0.0487) (0.0398) (0.1094) (0.0401) (0.0332)
Other 0.0437 0.0447 0.2501 0.0444 0.0405
(0.0509) (0.0503) (0.0827) (0.0505) (0.0468)
Constant 8.9272 9.3125 8.3897 9.3082 9.2800
(0.0648) (0.0627) (0.1307) (0.0625) (0.0602)
Linkage Variables Coverage: Indonesia Indonesia Indonesia Java Java
RSS 3736.3 2926.7 571.9 2927.8 2912.9
R-squared 0.29 0.33 0.35 0.33 0.33
N 13472 11361 2111 11361 11361
*  Standard errors in parentheses.
TABLE 2: BASIC SPECIFICATION








  +exog. amenity
  +initial firms
  preferred
  specification
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Supply Access - γ1 0.0994 0.1232 0.1338 0.1029 0.0876 0.093
(0.0233) (0.0235) (0.0223) (0.0172) (0.0189) (0.0193)
Distance, km/100 - δ1 1.0654 0.936 0.8709 0.8993 0.9177 0.8771
(0.2636) (0.1925) (0.1706) (0.1602) (0.3665) (0.1703)
Market Access - γ2: 0.2215 0.1903 0.1874   0.1399     0.1371   0.1450 
(0.0389) (0.0327) (0.034) (0.0327) (0.0289) (0.0329)
Distance, km/100 - δ2 2.6943 3.3643 3.5493   2.4598     2.2128   2.1368 
(0.4108) (0.4812) (0.4972) (0.6391) (0.5924) (0.5575)
Exports 0.2559 0.212 0.2039 0.1567 0.1588 0.1568
(0.0417) (0.0378) (0.0329) (0.0214) (0.0227) (0.0217)
Imports 0.3806 0.3233 0.3108    0.1803     0.1840    0.1837 
(0.0942) (0.0924) (0.0867) (0.0621) (0.0599) (0.0608)
Labour Pooling (province) 0.4235 0.4172 0.2567 0.2634 0.2639
(0.0444) (0.043) (0.037) (0.0351) (0.0374)
Spillovers: γ3 -0.0196   -0.0189
(0.0097) (0.012)
Distance, km/100 - δ3 14.7985   15.8318
(24.2186) (25.0457)
Competition   0.9918   1.0085    0.5034   0.5137 0.5084
(0.1487) (0.1488) (0.1288) (0.1303) (0.1291)
Jakarta -0.0316 -0.0019 -0.0158 -0.0172 0.0577 0.0195
(0.0312) (0.0305) (0.0329) (0.0261) (0.0407) (0.028)
Firm size per 100    0.0058     0.0058  0.0058
(0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0018)
Foreign ownership 0.3205 0.327   0.3283 
(0.0493) (0.0492) (0.0509)
Government ownership    0.3234     0.3265  0.3208
(0.0503) (0.0499) (0.0495)
Female participation -0.3266 -0.3257 -0.3257
(0.0661) (0.0651) (0.0669)
High school educated    0.3827     0.3850  0.3876
(0.0327) (0.0321) (0.0323)
Tertiary educated 1.7069 1.7054 1.709
(0.1165) (0.1156) (0.117)
Kabupaten skill level    0.2960     0.4157  0.216
(0.1151) (0.2266) (0.1064)








Distance to port, km  -0.0086 
(0.0236)
Industry 2 digit 2 digit 3 digit 3 digit 3 digit 3 digit
RSS 2927.8 2795.4 2745.2 2317.8 2308.3 2311.9
R-squared 0.332 0.362 0.373 0.471 0.473 0.472
N 11361 11361 11361 11361 11361 11361
Table 3: Estimates for Java
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   Comparison
   Col (6) 
Table 3
     Small GDP
     Kabupaten
     Drop own
     Kabupaten
      Lagging




( 1 )( 2 )( 3 )( 4 )( 5 )
Supply Access - γ1 0.093 0.0927 0.0742 0.1035 0.0938
(0.0193) (0.021) (0.017) (0.0165) (0.0209)
Distance, km/100 - δ1 0.8771  0.8107    0.9553   1.1053     0.8318
(0.1703) (0.1664) (0.1979)  (0.2198 )  (0.1665)
Market Access - γ2:   0.1450  0.1658 0.1462 0.1284 0.1535
(0.0329) (0.0357) (0.0317) (0.0316) (0.0349)
Distance, km/100 - δ2   2.1368  2.3208 2.0183 2.0511 2.1193
(0.5575) (0.5553) (0.4454) (0.5937) (0.5923)
Exports 0.1568   0.1468     0.1581    0.1643     0.1697
(0.0217) (0.0236) (0.0215)  (0.0229)   (0.0214)
Imports   0.1837  0.138 0.1799 0.1758   0.1547 
(0.0608) (0.0807) (0.0593) (0.0603) (0.0685)
Labour Pooling (province) 0.2639 0.1996 0.2642 0.2676 0.2808
(0.0374) (0.0486) (0.0368) (0.0368) (0.0398)
Competition 0.5084 0.4434 0.6419 0.7252 0.585
(0.1291) (0.1707) (0.1363) (0.1318) (0.1477)
Industry 3 digit 3 digit 3 digit 3 digit 3 digit
RSS 2311.9 1501.7 2322.9 2299.0 2027.8
R-squared 0.472 0.499 0.469 0.472 0.469
N 11361 7317 11359 11310 10152
Table 4: Sensitivity Tests
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1996 1991 1983
Supply Access - γ1 0.0985 0.1117 0.1129
(0.0241) (0.0315) (0.0478)
Distance, km/100 - δ1 0.9208 0.8453 0.8178
(0.2022) (0.3539) (0.4211)
Market Access - γ2: 0.1944 0.1927 0.0903
(0.0384) (0.045) (0.0485)
Distance, km/100 - δ2   2.6115   3.3872      7.2099 
(0.4782) (1.009) (5.535)
Exports    0.1527    0.0748   
(0.0312) (0.046)
Imports 0.2409 0.1647   0.0892 
(0.0825) (0.0481) (0.0466)
Competition 0.7611 1.1025 0.4186
(0.1445) (0.1644) (0.1286)
Jakarta 0.0166 0.0867 0.2007
(0.0303) (0.0334) (0.051)
firm size per 100 0.0067 0.0071 0.026
(0.0023) (0.003) (0.0066)
Foreign ownership 0.4308 0.669 1.2583
(0.0652) (0.1341) (0.088)
Government ownership 0.4419 0.4828 0.5483
(0.0611) (0.064) (0.0614)
# Firms lagged 10 years per 100
* 0.011 0 0.0186
(0.0037) (0.0001) (0.0071)
Coast -0.0015 0.0116 -0.0061
(0.0154) (0.0258) (0.0322)
Industry 3 digit 3 digit 3 digit
RSS 2708.6 2267.2 1192.5
R-squared 0.382 0.379 0.422
N 11361 7927 3857
*  For 1983 we used the first available year of SI data which is 1976.
Table 5: Comparisons Across Years
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Mean Std Min Max Mean Std Min Max
wage 4339.46 4010.37 549.70 36368.39 1700.42 1527.10 167.81 10588.57
supplier access 0.05 0.08 0 1 0.05 0.08 0 1
market access 0.02 0.04 0 0.94 0.01 0.04 0 1
imports 0.15 0.30 0 1 0.24 0.35 0 1
exports 0.11 0.29 0 1
j a k a r t a 0 . 2 3 0 . 4 201 0 . 2 7 0 . 4 401
size 193.92 512.23 20 14830 129.71 281.30 10 5338
foreign ownership 0.03 0.15 0 1 0.03 0.14 0 1
govt ownership 0.02 0.14 0 1 0.03 0.17 0 1
firms86 264.77 267.24 0 869 303.75 274.48 4 869
c o a s t 0 . 5 5 0 . 5 001 0 . 4 4 0 . 5 001






Table A1: Summary Statistics for 1991 and 1983
Java - 1991 Java - 1983
157 140
 
 